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Neumann: Is Indiana's Voter ID Law a Bridge to Nowhere

IS INDIANA'S VOTER ID LAW A
BRIDGE TO NOWHERE?
MATTHEW D.

NEUMANN*

INTRODUCTION

State laws requiring voters to show some form of identification

before casting a ballot are more and more commonplace.' Despite
their increasing prevalence, these laws are as controversial today as
when first introduced.' With regard to controversy, Indiana's Voter
ID law 3 is no exception.4 Considered one of the most stringent voter
identification' laws in the country,6 litigation has hounded Indiana's
Voter ID law since before taking effect on January 1, 2006.' Despite
surviving a challenge under the United States Constitution in April
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis; B.A. 2006, Indiana University - Bloomington. First, I would like to thank Professor Michael J. Pitts for his
guidance throughout the writing process. Second, I thank Executive Notes Editor Michele L.
Richey and Note Development Editor Jessica Mitchell for their tireless efforts to improve my
Note. Third, I thank my fiance, my family, and my friends for their constant love and support.
1. See Samuel P. Langholz, Note, Fashioninga ConstitutionalVoter-Identification Requirement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 731, 748 (2008) (stating that as of the end of 2007, thirty-four states have
enacted some form of voter identification laws).
2. Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing the Impact of Photo Identification at the Polls
Through an Examination of Provisional Balloting, 24 J. L. & POL (stating that "the debate over
[voter] identification laws remains far from any definitive conclusion"). See also Langholz, supra
note 1, at 733 ("In recent years, no election-law issue has generated such a divided response in
legislatures around the country [as voter identification laws] ....
).
3. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-25.1 (2009); See also IND. CODE §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-1 to
-8-30; 3-11.7-1-2 to -11.7-6-3; 9-24-16-10 (2009).
4. See Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp.2d 775, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
5. Commentators use "voter identification laws," "photo identification laws," "Voter ID
laws," and "Photo ID laws" interchangeably. This Note refers to both voter identification laws
and photo identification law as "voter identification laws." This Note refers to Indiana's photo
identification law as "Indiana's Voter ID law." Also, this Note will refer to Indiana's Voter ID
law as though it is still in effect. Although the Indiana Court of Appeals struck down the law, its
future is not exactly clear. The Indiana Supreme Court could grant transfer, vacate the opinion
of the Court of Appeals, and hold that the law is constitutional. The Supreme Court could also
do nothing and allow the decision of the Court of Appeals to remain intact. Even if this happens
however, it is likely that the Indiana Legislature would simply re-enact the law to comport with
the Court of Appeals' decision. Either way, this Note presumes that Indiana's Voter ID law will
survive in one form or another. See discussion infra Part II.A.
6. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraudin the Eye of the Beholder: The
Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1737, 1758 n.46 (2008).
7. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1614 (2008).
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2008,8 the League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc. (hereinafter
"League") once again challenged Indiana's Voter ID law.9 On September 17, 2009, the Indiana Court of Appeals struck down Indiana's
Voter ID law for violating the Indiana Constitution. 10 Currently, the
case is pending before the Indiana Supreme Court.1 '
League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc. v. Rokita (hereinafter
"League of Voters") 1 2 tests the validity of Indiana's Voter ID law
under the Indiana Constitution. 3 Because Indiana constitutional
election jurisprudence provides no clear answers, the Indiana Supreme Court should use an alternative framework to decide the case.
Using empiricism and pragmatism as analytic guideposts the Indiana
Supreme Court should decide the constitutionality of Indiana's Voter
ID law by answering one simple question: Does Indiana's Voter ID
law do more harm than good? Application of this alternative framework requires the Indiana Supreme Court to consider new empirical
evidence,'1 4 revealing that Indiana's Voter ID law survives constitutional muster. Although it should be upheld under the Indiana Constitution, the virility of Indiana's Voter ID law should not be
overstated. In truth, the Indiana Legislature probably did not have
cause to pass Indiana's Voter ID law at the time it was enacted. On
the other hand, the law hardly seems to cause enough problems to
justify striking it down. Stuck in a proverbial no man's land where it
creates little harm but accomplishes little good, Indiana's Voter ID
law may ultimately be a bridge to nowhere.
Part I of this Note provides general background information about
Indiana's Voter ID law. Part II of this Note examines the merits of
this new state constitutional challenge to the law, League of Voters.
Part III of this Note proposes an alternative framework with which
the Indiana Supreme Court should decide this case. Part IV of this
Note applies this alternative framework to resolve the constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID law.
8. Id. at 1624.
9. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 3, League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v.
Rokita, No. 49D13-0806-PL-027627 (Ind. Super. Ct. filed June 20, 2008), rev'd, 915 N.E.2d 151
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
10. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 915 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
11. See Appellant's Petition to Transfer at 1, League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v.
Rokita, No. 49A02-0901-CV-00040 (Ind. filed Oct. 19, 2009); Appellee's Petition to Transfer at
1, League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, No. 49A02-0901-CV-00040 (Ind. filed Oct. 19,
2009).
12. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, No. 49D13-0806-PL-027627 (Ind. Sup.
Ct. 2008), rev'd, 915 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
13. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 3, League of Women Voters of Ind.,
Inc. v. Rokita, No. 49D13-0806-PL-027627 (Ind. Sup. Ct. filed July 29, 2008), rev'd, 915 N.E.2d
151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
14. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
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GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT INDIANA'S VOTER

ID

LAW

Polemical since its enactment, Indiana's Voter ID law is a "partisan
legislative disagreement that has spilled out of the state house [and]
into the courts."' 5 At least one commentator predicted that surviving
challenge under the United States Constitution, rather than settle the
debate over Indiana's Voter ID law, may have "breathe[d] additional
life into the battle."1 6 This prediction proved to be accurate on September 17, 2009, when the Indiana Court of Appeals struck down Indiana's Voter ID law. 17 As the Indiana Supreme Court decides
whether to grant transfer and potentially prepares to decide the merits
of the case, it is important to accurately frame the debate that surrounds Indiana's Voter ID law. 8
A.

Passage of Indiana's Voter ID Law

A perceived rise in voter fraud prompted an almost national movement by state legislatures to pass voter identification laws. 9 This perceived rise in voter fraud reached a critical mass after the 2000
presidential election.2 ° Bush v. Gore decided the unimaginably close
2000 presidential race and "reminded the nation that every vote

counts in a closely divided political environment. '21 On the heels of
the United States Supreme Court's controversial decision in Bush v.
Gore, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (hereinafter
"HAVA") in 2002.22 HAVA requires first-time voters registering by
23
mail to provide identification at the polls before casting a ballot.

Spurred to action, between 2002 and 2007, thirty-four states passed
voter identification laws that not only complied with but actually went
beyond the mandates of HAVA.

4

15. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
16. Pitts, supra note 2, at 475-76 (noting that "no opinion garnered a majority as four separate Justices penned opinions"); See also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct.
1610, 1613 (2008).
17. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 915 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
18. See supra note 11.
19. Langholz, supra note 1, at 748.
20. Langholz, supra note 1, at 745 (noting that after the 2000 presidential election "Congress turned its attention to election reform"); See also Evan D. Montgomery, The Missouri
Photo-ID Requirementfor Voting: Ensuring Both Access and Integrity, 72 Mo. L. REV. 651, 651
(2007).
21. Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 638 (2007) (noting that
"George W. Bush received roughly one more vote than Al Gore for every 11,100 votes cast in
Florida ...").
22. Help America Vote Act of 2002, PUB. L. No. 107-252, 116 STAT. 1666 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 36 and 42 U.S.C.); See also Langholz, supra note 1, at 745.
23. Overton, supra note 21, at 639.
24. Langholz, supra note 1, at 748.
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In 2005, the Indiana Legislature followed suit and passed Indiana's
Voter ID law.
Indiana's Voter ID law provides: "[A] voter who
desires to vote an official ballot at an election shall provide proof of
identification. ' 26 For example, on election day, the voter arrives at
the polls, and the poll worker asks the voter to show identification.2 7
If the voter does not offer valid identification, the poll worker challenges her by informing the voter that she cannot cast a regular ballot
but may cast a provisional ballot instead. 28 Next, the voter casts a
provisional ballot, which is a tentative paper ballot that will not officially influence the outcome of the election unless the voter later validates the ballot. 29 To validate the provisional ballot, the voter must
return to the county election board-the board of local officials ultimately responsible for administering the election-within ten days of
the election and provide proper identification.3" If the voter returns
with the proper ID, the county election board determines if the provisional ballot is valid.3 '
The most controversial aspect of Indiana's Voter ID law is that Indiana requires voters to present a very specific form of identification.3 2
An acceptable ID must meet several criteria.33 First, the document
must contain the individual's name.3 4 Second, the document must
contain the individual's photo.3 5 Third, the document must contain an
expiration date and must not be expired.3 6 Fourth, the State of Indiana or the federal government must issue the document.3 7 Despite
the controversy stemming from these stringent requirements, 3 8 propo25. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-25.1 (2009); See also IND. CODE §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2, 3-11-8-1
to -8-30; 3-11.7-1-2 to -11.7-6-3 (2009); See also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.
Ct. 1610, 1614 (2008).
26. § 3-11-8-25.1.
27. §§ 3-11-8-25.1(b), (e), -10-1.2. Indiana's Voter ID law exempts two groups from its identification requirement: (1) persons voting in person at a polling place located at a state licensed
care facility at which the voter lives and (2) absentee voters.
28. §§ 3-11-8-20, -8-25.1(c), -8-27.5.
29. § 3-11-8-22.1(f) (stating that the voter "shall be provided with a provisional ballot ...
rather than a regular official ballot if the voter wishes to cast a vote").
30. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(a).
31. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b) (stating that the county election board validates the provisional ballot
if the voter provides proper identification and executes an affidavit stating the voter is the same
individual who filled out the provisional ballot in question).
32. § 3-11-8-25.1; See also Pitts, supra note 2, at 482 (noting that "not just any photo identification ...

will suffice").

33. § 3-11-8-25.1.
34. § 3-5-2-40.5 (requiring the "name conforms to the name in the individual's voter registration record").
35. § 3-5-2-40.5(2).
36. § 3-5-2-40.5(3)(A)-(B) (providing that identification is not expired for purposes of Indiana's Voter ID law if it was valid at the time of the last general election).
37. § 3-5-2-40.5(4).
38. Montgomery, supra note 20, at 651 (characterizing the debate over voter identification
as "partisan and ideological").
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nents offer a number of justifications in support of Indiana's Voter ID

law.39

Proponents justify Indiana's Voter ID law as a fraud prevention
measure.4 ° Without requiring voters to present identification, a voter
can cast a fraudulent vote by "showing up at the polls claiming to be
someone else-someone who has left the district, or died too recently
to have been removed from the list of registered voters, or someone
who has not voted yet on election day."4 1 If an election official forces
the voter to prove his identity by presenting a government-issued ID
card, this "in-person voter fraud" is less likely to occur.

2

Proponents also justify Indiana's Voter ID law as increasing public
confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. 3 If the "specter of
voter fraud"4 4 is allowed to impend public confidence in our electoral
system, it has potential to "breed distrust of our government."45 The
perception that one's legitimate vote will be overshadowed by fraudulent votes can conceivably drive "honest citizens out of the democratic
process."4 6 Therefore, a State has an interest in attempting to amplify
public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process.

7

Finally, proponents argue that Indiana's Voter ID law is justified by
the commonsense observation that carrying identification is necessary
in our modern society.48 A person must present identification to do a
variety of activities in everyday life and voting should be no differ-

ent.4 9 Simply put, as Judge Richard Posner noted, "it is exceedingly

39. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1-9, League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, No. 49D13-0806-PL-027627 (Ind. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 15,
2008), rev'd, 915 N.E.2d 151 (Ind.Ct. App. 2009); See also Crawford, 128 S.Ct. at 1613-24. See
generally Overton, supra note 21, at 638-44; David Schultz, Less than Fundamental: The Myth of
Voter Fraudand the Coming of the Second GreatDisenfranchisement,34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
483, 492-501 (2008); Montgomery, supra note 20, at 651-52; Langholz, supra note 1, at 733-54.
40. Montgomery, supra note 20, at 651 (stating that voter identification laws are "arguably
designed to prevent in-person voter fraud at the polls").
41. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 11 (citing
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 2007)).
42. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1637 (2008); See also
Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 6, at 1741.
43. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 6, at 1741.
44. Schultz, supra note 39, at 492.
45. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 6, at 1738-39 (quoting Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S.
1, 4 (2006)).
46. Id. at 1739.
47. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1620 (2008); See also
Andrew N. DeLaney, Note, Appearance Matters: Why the State has an Interest in Preventingthe
Appearance of Voting Fraud, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 847, 847 (2008).
48. But see Overton, supra note 21, at 644-50 (criticizing common sense arguments as a
rhetorical device of voter identification advocates).
49. Id. at 650 (noting how photo-identification advocates argue that one must present ID to
board a plane, enter a federal building, cash a check, use a credit card, rent a video, and buy
alcohol).
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difficult to maneuver in today's America without a photo ID."5 ° Because identification is an ordinary part of daily life, requiring voters to
present identification before casting a ballot is a logical and reasonable electoral precaution.5 1
Nonetheless, commentators and litigants have been tireless in their
attacks on Indiana's Voter ID law.5 2 First, opponents attack Indiana's
Voter ID law as burdening the right to vote.53 The right to vote is a
fundamental right under the United States Constitution. 4 Requiring
a voter to present identification creates an additional obstacle that
may prevent a potential voter from casting a ballot.5 Thus, requiring
voters to present government-issued ID cards before voting unnecessarily burdens their fundamental right.56
Second, opponents attack Indiana's Voter ID law as a poll tax in
disguise.5 7 The Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from collecting a tax before allowing a voter
to cast a ballot.5 8 Most states with voter identification laws provide
voters with free IDs because requiring an ID for voting purposes that
59
can only be obtained by paying money is undoubtedly a poll tax.
Indiana is no exception, and although a fee is normally required to
obtain a state-issued ID,6 ° the Indiana Legislature, upon enactment of
the Voter ID law, waived all fees for state-issued ID cards for those
that cannot afford to pay.61 Regardless, opponents of Indiana's Voter
ID law counter that a birth certificate or a passport, for which most
50. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951.
51. But cf Overton, supra note 21, at 651 (the costs of erroneous exclusion differ with voting as opposed to other daily activities).
52. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 13, at 1-7; See also
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1613-24 (2008); See generally Overton,
supra note 21, at 663-73; Schultz, supra note 39, at 492-501; Langholz, supra note 1, at 754-86.
53. See Overton, supra note 21, at 664.
54. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1628 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Il1. Bd. of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)) ("It is beyond cavil that 'voting is of the most
fundamental significance under our constitutional structure."'); See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1; See U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964).
55. See Schultz, supra note 39, at 483.
56. Overton, supra note 21, at 664 ("[A] photo-identification requirement may unduly burden the fundamental right to vote that stems from the First and Fourteenth Amendments").
57. Langholz, supra note 1, at 762 (noting Rep. Pelosi called voter ID laws a "modern day
poll tax") (quoting 152 CONG.. REC. H6769 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Pelosi)); Id. (noting then Senator, now President Obama, called Georgia's voter ID laws a "poll
tax for the 21st century") (quoting 153 CONG. REC. S7059 (daily ed. June 5, 2007) (statement of
Sen. Obama)); See Overton, supra note 21 at 669.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; See also Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
666 (1966); Langholz, supra note 1, at 761.
59. See, e.g., Langholz, supra note 1, at 762-66.
60. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles: Identification Cards, http://www.in.gov/bmv/4818.
htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009) (listing $13 as the price for obtaining or renewing an Indianaissued identification card).
61. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1614 n.4 (2008).
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states charge a fee, is necessary to obtain the free identification, and
therefore voter identification laws are still a poll tax.62 Stated otherwise, providing free ID cards does not shield voter identification laws
from6 3 poll tax claims because of the ancillary costs of obtaining the free
ID.

B.

The First Challenge to Indiana's Voter ID Law

Despite the best efforts of commentators and litigants, Indiana's
Voter ID law survived challenge under the United States Constitution
in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.' Announcing the

judgment of the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens declined to apply
strict scrutiny and instead applied a balancing approach, the undue
burden standard, in upholding Indiana's Voter ID law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.65 Cautioning
courts to avoid applying a "litmus test," Justice Stevens stated that a
"court must identify and evaluate the interests put forward by the
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, and then
make the 'hard judgment."' 66 Ultimately, Justice Stevens concluded
the petitioners' facial challenge failed because Indiana's interest in

protecting electoral integrity outweighs the burdens imposed by Indiana's Voter ID law.67
C. The Futility of Indiana's Voter ID Law

Despite surviving challenge under the United States Constitution,68
one should avoid overestimating the pertinence of Indiana's Voter ID
law. In truth, close examination of the law's mechanics reveals that
the Indiana Legislature may not have had cause to pass Indiana's
Voter ID law in the first place.69 Simply put, Indiana's Voter ID law

may not be justified as a fraud prevention measure because in-person
62. Id. at 1631 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Indiana counties charge anywhere from
$3 to $12 for a birth certificate (and in some other States the fee is significantly higher)); See also
Ind. Democratic Party, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 789-92 (discussing in-depth the procedures for obtaining state-issued identification in Indiana).
63. See Langholz, supra note 1, at 763 (discussing the argument that the "incidental costs
associated with obtaining an identification card still constitute a poll tax").
64. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616.
65. Id. For a more in depth discussion of the undue burden standard see discussion infra
note 230 and accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1623.
68. See supra text accompanying note 65.
69. See Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp.2d 775, 789-92 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (noting
that challengers to Indiana's Voter ID law argued that its passage is "not justified by existing
circumstances or evidence"); Myriad commentators posit that conservative leaning legislatures
across the country have been unjustified in passing voter identification laws, Indiana included;
See, e.g., Overton, supra note 21, at 644-53.
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voter fraud is merely used as a pretense for the law's enactment.7 °
The ability of Indiana's Voter ID law to prevent in-person voter fraud,
or "voter identity theft," is the most central justification supporting its
enactment.7 ' Unfortunately for proponents, "actual evidence of voter
impersonation fraud is rare and difficult to come by."7 2 In fact, in
Crawford, Justice Stevens looked high and low for evidence of in-person voter fraud and found only two examples in the entire country in
the last one hundred and forty years.7 3 Commentators generally agree
with this conclusion and posit that the prevalence of in-person voter
fraud, if it occurs at all, is not widespread and has certainly never risen
to the level of influencing the outcome of an election. 74 To overcompensate for this lack of comprehensive empirical evidence, proponents
too often use anecdotal evidence to demonstrate the apparent prevalence of voter fraud.7 5 This overcompensation is dangerous because
"[v]oter-fraud anecdotes are often misleading, incomplete, and unrepresentative."7 6 Unfortunately, these misleading anecdotes, despite
their empirical shortcomings, are rhetorically effective because they
inject a heated verbosity into the debate. 7
Despite the rhetorical savvy of those that support Indiana's Voter
ID law, opponents are correct to impale the law for failing to solve the
very problem at which it is aimed. 8 In truth, aimed at curing a nonexistent problem, Indiana's Voter ID law is more accurately characterized as a "solution in search of a problem. '79 As the debate inevitably
rages on, a new challenge to Indiana's Voter ID law is before the Indiana Supreme Court.80 Ultimately, as the Indiana Supreme Court
prepares to issue the final word on Indiana's Voter ID law,8 the
Court should not discount the combative overtones of this partisan
70. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 6, at 1737 (stating that "actual evidence of voter
impersonation fraud is rare and difficult to come by").
71. Pitts, supra note 2, at 500-01; See generally supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
72. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 6, at 1738; See also Pitts, supra note 2, at 500
("Some opponents of photo identification take the position that voter impersonation fraud (i.e.
voter identity theft) almost never occurs at America's polling places.").
73. Pitts, supra note 2, at 500 (discussing Justice Stevens' scouring of the evidentiary
record).
74. See Schultz, supra note 39, at 501.
75. See Overton, supra note 21, at 644-45 ("[A]necdotes about voter fraud . . . fail to indicate the frequency of the alleged fraud.").
76. Id. at 644.
77. See Stephen Ansolabehere, Access Versus Integrity in Voter IdentificationRequirements,
63 N.Y.U ANN. SURV. AM. L. 613, 626 (2008) (discussing the "heated rhetoric that has inflated
the debate over voter ID requirements in the United States").
78. See supra text accompanying note 70.
79. Langholz, supra note 1, at 733 (quoting 152 CONG. REc. H6777 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2006)
(statement of Rep. Holt)).
80. See discussion infra Part II.
81. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 13, at 8-9.
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debate.82 A prescient peek behind the proverbial curtain may reveal
the battle over Indiana's Voter ID law for what it is, a struggle for
political control.8 3
II.

THE MERITS OF THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS
OF INDIANA, INc. V. ROKITA

A.

Introduction to the Case

On June 20, 2008, the League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc.
filed a lawsuit in Marion County Superior Court, against Todd Rokita
in his official capacity as the Indiana Secretary of State (hereinafter
"the State"). 84 The League challenged Indiana's Voter ID law as violating the Indiana Constitution.8" The League moved for an expedited status conference in hopes of resolving the case before the
November 2008 general election.8 6 This motion went undecided, and
the trial court dismissed the case on December 17, 2008.87 On January
15, 2009, the League filed its appeal with the Indiana Court of Appeals.8 8 On September 17, 2009, the Indiana Court of Appeals struck
down Indiana's Voter ID law for violating the Indiana Constitution. 89
Currently the State of Indiana is preparing to file its appeal to the
Indiana Supreme Court.9°
It is not an understatement to say that the decision of the Indiana
Court of Appeals came as a surprise to most. 91 At first glance the
82. See Schultz, supra note 39, at 494-500 ("[Wlhipp[ing] up hysteria that droves of dead
people, illegal immigrants, vote brokers, and ex-felons are cheating their way into voting booths,
stealing elections from honest decent Republicans, and diluting the votes of red, white, and blue
Americans.").
83. See id. at 500 (noting that underlying voter identification laws may be "partisan Republican efforts to suppress voting").
84. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 9, at 1.
85. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 13, at 7.
86. Motion for Expedited Status Conference at 1, League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v.
Rokita, No. 49D02-0806-PL-027627 (Ind. Super. Ct. filed July 29, 2008), rev'd, 915 N.E.2d 151
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that its goal was to have "this litigation resolved before the general
election").
87. Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1, League of Women Voters of Ind.,
Inc. v. Rokita, No. 49D13-0806-PL-027627 (Ind. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2008), rev'd, 915 N.E.2d 151
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
88. Notice of Appeal at 1, League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, No. 49D130806-PL-027627 (Ind. Super. Ct.filed Dec. 17, 2008), rev'd, 915 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
89. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 915 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
90. Immediately after the Court of Appeals issued their September 17, 2009 opinion declaring Indiana's Voter ID law unconstitutional, Indiana Secretary of State Todd Rokita stated that
"I have already requested that the Indiana Solicitor General seek immediate transfer of the case
to the Indiana Supreme Court for review." Jim Shelia, Court: Voter ID law unconstitutional,
Daniels calls ruling act of judicial arrogance, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.wishtv.com/dpp/news/
indiana/Courtdeclaresvoter ID unconstitutional_20090917.
91. See Michael W. Hoskins, COA strikes down law: Attorneys will ask Indiana Supreme
Court to intervene, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.theindianalawyer.comhtml/deta-pageFulI.asp?
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Court of Appeals' decision seems to be quite dramatic. Closer exami-

nation, however, reveals that the opinion is not as sweeping as many
believe. Ultimately, the Indiana Court of Appeals did not find any

problem with requiring voters to show identification. Stated another
way, the Court of Appeals has not said that requiring voters to show
identification before casting a ballot violates the Indiana Constitu-

tion.9 2 Therefore, the essence of voter identification survives. The
Court of Appeals simply held that Indiana's Voter ID law-as currently drafted-creates different classes of voters in violation of the
Indiana Constitution.9 3 Arguably the decision of the Court of Appeals is limited because the problems identified by the court are easily

fixable. Ultimately, if the Indiana Legislature simply removes the exceptions-i.e. removes the classes of voters created by the law-and
requires every Hoosier voter to show identification, Indiana's Voter
ID law would seemingly be constitutional in the eyes of the Indiana
Court of Appeals.

To recognize the limits of the Indiana Court of Appeals' decision is
not to deemphasize its importance. Quite the opposite, the Indiana
Court of Appeals' decision serves two important functions. First, the
reaction of public officials in the wake of the Court of Appeals' decision demonstrates the highly partisan nature of the debate surrounding voter identification. Second, the opinion of the Court of Appeals
provides insight into how the Indiana Supreme Court will analyze the
case.
The reaction of public officials in the wake of the Court of Appeals'

decision demonstrates the highly partisan tone of the debate surrounding voter identification. Within days, three officials in Indiana

made public comments about the decision. Governor Mitch Daniels
stated: "It's a preposterous decision, an extreme decision and came in
this case from a judge who's been reversed before and I expect that to

happen again.... It's just bad law. It's an act of judicial arrogance....

content=04603 ("Not often does an Indiana appellate court invalidate a state statute the way the
Indiana Court of Appeals did Sept. 17.").
92. League of Voters, 915 N.E.2d 151. The issue turned on whether Indiana's Voter ID law
is a regulation or a qualification. Id. at 157; If the Court of Appeals had held that the law is a
qualification, presumably they would have said that voter identification, in and of itself, is unconstitutional. Instead, the Court held: "the Voter I.D. Law is not a qualification, but is rather a
regulation of the time, place, or manner in which otherwise qualified voters must cast their votes.
Therefore, if the Voter I.D. Law is to run afoul of our constitution, it is not for the reason that it
imposes a qualification upon our electorate in the absence of constitutional provision." Id. at
161. This means that requiring voter to show ID is constitutionally permissible, just not the way
the Indiana Legislature drafted the law. Id at 151-69.
93. The court struck down the law "because it regulates voters in a manner that is not
uniform and impartial." Id. at 169.
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the ruling [is] transparently [political]."'9 4 Indiana Secretary of State
Todd Rokita stated: "Some continue to force us to use taxpayer dollars on an issue that has already been reviewed by the US Supreme
Court. The gamesmanship going on here is irresponsible and needs to
stop." 95 Finally, Indiana Attorney General Greg Zoeller stated: "The
state's long-held view is that the voter ID law is constitutional, and we
will vigorously defend the statute in arguing that position before the
Indiana Supreme Court."9 6 These statements did not go unnoticed.
The Indiana State Bar Association issued the following in response to
Governor Daniels statements:
[Clomments such as those attributed to the governor are not helpful in
advancing appropriate respect for the courts and the judicial process,
and honoring the separation of powers doctrine. The ISBA respects
the governor's, and every citizen's, right to disagree with the decision.
There are rules, however, that govern judicial conduct and appropriate procedures for dealing with complaints about the judiciary. Comments about individual judges are
97 not the way to express
disagreement with any court opinion.
With pointed clarity, these reactions to the Indiana Court of Appeals' decision highlight the partisan nature of the debate surrounding
voter identification.
More importantly, the opinion of the Court of Appeals provides
insight into how the Indiana Supreme Court may analyze the case.
Although the Indiana Supreme Court may have the final word, the
Court of Appeals' opinion previews the analysis of the three legal issues presented in League of Voters: (1) whether the League's challenge is justiciable; (2) whether Indiana's Voter ID law violates
Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution; and (3) whether Indiana's Voter ID law violates Article II, Section 2 of the Indiana
Constitution.9 8
The Court of Appeals held that the League's challenge is justiciable.99 Rokita argued that as the Secretary of State he is not responsible for enforcement of election laws. 1" The court pointed out that the
League's case was a declaratory judgment and that Indiana law intends "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity
94. Jim Sheila, Politics rule voter ID ruling reaction, Court strikes down controversial law,
Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.wishtv.com/dpp/news/politics/Politics-rulesvoterID-ruling.reaction
20090917; see also Hoskins, supra note 91.
95. See Sheila, supra note 90.
96. Bill Ruthhart, Voter ID decision resurrects debate, Sept. 18, 2009, http://www.indy.com/
posts/voter-id-decision-resurrects-debate.
97. Hoskins, supra note 91.
98. League of Voters, 915 N.E.2d at 154.
99. See id. at 156-57.
100. Id. at 156.
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with respect to rights, status and other relations; and is to be liberally
construed and administered." 10 1 The court also pointed out that
"Rokita is the 'chief election official' for the State of Indiana.' 10 2 Accordingly, the court
held that "the League named a proper defendant
10 3
matter.',
this
in
Turning to the second issue, the Court of Appeals held that Indiana's Voter ID law, as enacted, runs afoul of Article I, Section 23 of
the Indiana Constitution. 0 4 In short, the Indiana Court of Appeals
struck down the law "because it regulates voters in a manner that is
not uniform and impartial."'0 5 Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana
Constitution provides: "The General Assembly shall not grant to any
citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the
same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.' 0 6 Statutes run
afoul of Article I, Section 23 when "the lines drawn appear arbitrary
or manifestly unreasonable, and the challenger must negate every reasonable basis for the classification. " 0 In particular, the court found
that the law impermissibly creates two classes of voters.
The first class of voters impermissibly created by the law is absentee
voters, i.e. mail in voters.' 0 8 In Indiana, "[a]n absentee voter is not
required to provide proof of identification when: (1) mailing, delivering, or transmitt[ing] an absentee ballot under Section 1 of this chapter; or (2) voting before an absentee board under Section 25 of this
chapter."'0 9 The League cited language from the Indiana Supreme
Court that recognized that "the legislature believed it in the interest of
Indiana voters to more stringently govern absentee balloting.""' The
League argued therefore "it is irrational for our legislature to require
identification of in-person voters but not require an affidavit affirming
the identity of mail-in voters."'' The court agreed
and concluded
12
that the statute was unreasonable for that reason.
The second problematic class of voters created by the law are those
voters residing at a state licensed care facility. 1 3 In Indiana, "[a]
voter who votes in person at a precinct polling place that is located at
a state licensed care facility where the voter resides is not required to
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 157 (quoting IND. CODE § 34-14-1-2 (2009)).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 161-69.
Id. at 169.
IND. CONST. art. I, § 23.
W.C.B. v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1057, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
League of Voters, 915 N.E.2d at 162.
Id.. (quoting § 3-11-10-1.2).
Id. at 163 (quoting Horseman v. Keller, 841 N.E.2d 164, 173 (Ind. 2006)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163-65.
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provide proof of identification before voting.""' 4 The State argued
that self-evident realities of residing at a state licensed care facility
justified the exception in the law." 5 The court disagreed and held that
the special treatment was based upon "an arbitrary or unnatural characteristic which grants an unequal privilege or immunity to residents
of state licensed care facilities which also happen to be polling
places. ' 116 Accordingly, given the two impermissible classes of voters,
the Indiana Court of Appeals held that Indiana's Voter ID law violates Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution and must be
declared void." 7
Faced with the Court of Appeals decision-which at first glance appears quite remarkable given that it reaches a different result than the
United States Supreme court-it is important to recognize the limits
in the Court of Appeals' decision. To be precise, it is important to
recognize what the Indiana Court of Appeals did not say. The Court
of Appeals did not say that requiring voters to show identification
before voting violates the Indiana Constitution. Therefore, according
to the Court of Appeals, voter identification, in and of itself, does not
run afoul of the Indiana Constitution. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals struck down Indiana's Voter ID law because of the "(1) the disparate treatment between mail-in absentee voters and in-person
voters; [and] (2) the disparate treatment between voters who reside at
state licensed care facilities that by happenstance are polling places
and elderly and disabled voters who do not reside at state licensed
care facilities that also happen to be polling places."'1 8 Arguably
these problems are fixable, even easily fixable. To remedy these
problems the Indiana Legislature need only remove the disparate
treatment. Absentee voters must be required to fill out an affidavit.
Residents of state licensed care facilities must be required to show
identification like all other Hoosier voters. If the Indiana Legislature
makes these two relatively simple changes, then Indiana's Voter ID
law is presumably constitutional in the eyes of the Indiana Court of
Appeals.
Ultimately, the Indiana Court of Appeals' decision is not as sweeping as many headlines seem to indicate. In short, the holding of the
Court of Appeals was rather limited. In the end, Indiana's Voter ID
law-despite being held unconstitutional by the Court of Appealsseems to have escaped largely unscathed. Even if the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court, the Indiana
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(quoting §§ 3-10-1-7.2; 11-8-25.2).
at 164.
at 165.
at 161-62.
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Legislature need only require every single Hoosier voter to show identification before casting a ballot. If the Indiana Legislature can make
these changes, voter identification will survive in Indiana.
B.

The Heart of Indiana's Voter ID Law

Any broad pronouncement about the (un)constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID law will stem-not from Article I, Section 23-but instead from Article I, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution. If the
Indiana Supreme Court is to hold that requiring voters to show identification before voting violates the Indiana Constitution, it will have to
happen under Article II, Section 2. Thus, the heart of Indiana's Voter
ID law lies in Article II, Section 2.
The Article II, Section 2 issue is summarized as follows: Whether
Indiana's Voter ID law is a legitimate exercise of the Indiana Legislature's power to administer and regulate elections or unconstitutionally
imposes an additional requirement for voter eligibility.11 9 With regard
to this issue, the Court of Appeals found no problem, stating that "if
the Voter I.D. Law is to run afoul of our constitution, it is not [because it violates Article II, Section 2]. '' 12° In truth this issue is convoluted and actually touches on three provisions of the Indiana
Constitution.
1. The Power of the Indiana Legislature to Regulate and Administer Elections. - The League argued that the Indiana Constitution defines the requirements a Hoosier must satisfy before she is eligible to
vote. 121 Working in concert, Article II, Section 2 and Article II, Section 14 together set forth four basic prerequisites that must be satisfied before a Hoosier is eligible to vote: (1) the person must be a U.S.
citizen; (2) the person must be at least eighteen years old; (3) the person must have lived in the precinct for at least 30 days; and (4) the
person must be registered to vote. 122 The League argued that the Indiana Legislature is prohibited from imposing additional voting requirements beyond those four without passing a constitutional
amendment.1 2 3 Because Indiana's Voter ID law adds a fifth requireID card,
ment, that voters possess and present a government-issued
12 4
unconstitutional.
is
law
ID
Voter
Indiana's
119. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 13, at 1-7; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 1-9.
120. League of Voters, 915 N.E.2d at 161.
121. Id.
122. IND. CONST. art. II, § 2; IND. CONST. art. II, § 14.
123. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 13, at 5 (relying on Morris
v. Powell, 25 N.E. 221, 223 (Ind. 1890)).
124. Id. at 6.
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Indiana courts have repeatedly struck down additional voting requirements imposed by the legislature. 25 In Board of Election Commissioner v. Knight,126 the Indiana Legislature granted women the
right to vote, even though the Indiana Constitution did not include
women as part of the electorate.127 Indianapolis citizens brought an
action to enjoin election officials from allowing women to vote.2 8
The Indiana Supreme Court agreed and held that the law granting
women suffrage was unconstitutional because the law would allow
persons to cast a ballot who are not part of the electorate as defined
by Article II, Section 2.129
While Knight demonstrates that the legislature is constrained by the
election provisions of the Indiana Constitution, this case presents two
problems. 130 First, it is awkward for the League to argue that a case
so blatantly about disenfranchising women now supports the argument that Indiana's Voter ID law should be struck down because of its
disenfranchising effect on voters. 131 Second, Knight can be distinguished because, unlike the League's challenge to Indiana's Voter ID
1 32
law, the Indiana Constitution spoke directly to the issue in Knight.
At that time, Article II, Section 2 only conferred the right to vote on
white males, while the challenged law gave women in Indianapolis the
right vote. 133 By the language of the constitution it was self-evident
that the Indiana Legislature had overstepped its bounds.1 3 4 In contrast, League of Voters presents an issue about which the Indiana Constitution is silent. 135 The Indiana Constitution provides nothing about
requiring voters to present government-issued ID, and therefore, the
boundary of the legislature's power with regard to Indiana's Voter ID
law is ambiguous. In short, the League cannot successfully argue that
Indiana's Voter ID law is outside the power of the Indiana Legislature
without defining the boundaries of that power.
In response to the League's Article II, Section 2 argument, the State
countered that Indiana's Voter ID law is constitutional because the
Indiana Legislature passed the Voter ID law pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate elections. 136 The State cited two different
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
CONST.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See Bd. of Election Comm'r v. Knight, 117 N.E. 565, 575 (Ind. 1917).
117 N.E. 565.
Id. at 567.
Id.
Id. at 575.
See id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (conferring on women the right to vote).
Bd. of Election Comm'r v. Knight, 117 N.E. 565, 566-67 (Ind. 1917) (quoting IND.
art. II, § 2).
Id.
ld.
See IND. CONST. art. 11, § 14 (discussing voting requirements).
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 2-3.
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constitutional provisions as sources of this legislative power.13 7 One
source of this power is Article II, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitu'
tion, which provides "[a]ll elections shall be free and equal."138
A second source is Article II, Section 14, which commands "[t]he General
Assembly
shall provide for the registration of all persons entitled to
1 39
vote."'

Relying on Article II, Section 1, the State argued "[i]nherent in the
requirement of holding 'free and equal' elections lies the power of the
state to protect the rights of citizens to a fair and reliable electoral
system. ' 140 This argument was based on the premise that in-person
voter fraud cannot occur if the voter is required to prove their identity. 141 Although the State failed to clearly articulate its point, the
State essentially argued that fraud prevention is a conduit to a reliable
electoral system and a reliable electoral system is a conduit to a free
and clear election.1 42 Therefore, because preventing fraud ensures
that elections are free and clear, passing Indiana's Voter ID law is a
legitimate
exercise of the Indiana Legislature's Article II, Section 1
143
power.
Interestingly, despite the availability of colorable arguments to both
sides, neither party offered a definition of "free and clear."'' 44 The
State would have been wise to define "free and clear" to mean that all
elections should be free and clear of fraudulent voting practices, which
is the purpose of Indiana's Voter ID law. The League would have
been prudent to define "free and clear" to mean that all elections shall
be free and clear from overly burdensome laws, like Indiana's Voter
ID law, that discourage voters from participating in the electoral process. Nonetheless, neither party explicitly provided a definition, and
presumably left the Indiana Supreme Court to define "free and clear."
Next, grounding the legislative power to enact Indiana's Voter ID
law in the voter registration provision of Article II, Section 14, the
State argued that "[Indiana's Voter ID law] is merely a procedure of
verifying the identity of a registered voter-the most fundamental
pre-existing voter eligibility criterion.' 1 45 Essentially, the State was
137. Id. at 2.
138. IND. CONST. art. II, § 1.
139. IND. CONST. art. II, § 14.
140. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 3.
141. Id. at 7, 11.
142. Id. at 2-3. The State fails to set forth and connect each premise of the argument but
instead cursorily states without elaboration that "[b]y preventing voter fraud, the identification
requirement ensures compliance with the Article II, Section 1 mandate that each vote equally
influence the result of an election." Id.
143. Id. at 2-3.
144. IND. CONST. art. II, § 1. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note
13, at 1-7; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 1-9.
145. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 3-4.
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146
positing that identifying voters is part of the registration process.
Accordingly, because the Indiana Legislature has the power to register voters and identifying voters is part of that registration process,
Indiana's7 Voter ID law is a legitimate exercise of that legislative
14

power.

Previously, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the registration
system the Indiana Legislature imposes on the electorate is presumptively constitutional. 148 In Simmons v. Byrd,149 citizens challenged Indiana's voter registration laws as unconstitutional. 150 The argument in
Simmons, very similar to the League's argument in League of Voters,
was that although the Indiana Legislature passed registration laws
pursuant to Article II, Section 14, the registration laws impose additional voting qualifications as defined by Article II, Section 2.151 The
court rejected this argument and upheld the registration laws as constitutional, finding that Article II, Section 2 and Article II, Section 14
are not in conflict. 152 The court, discussing Article II, Section 14, recognized that "it is made the duty of the [Indiana] General Assembly
by the [Indiana] Constitution to enact a law providing . . . for the
registration of all voter. ... ' In discussing the importance of regis-

tration laws the court also stated, "[w]hen the ballot box becomes the
receptacle of fraudulent votes, the freedom and equality of elections
are destroyed. 15 4 Seemingly validating both arguments of the State,
Simmons appears to announce two principles that provide the Indiana
Legislature with the power to enact Indiana's Voter ID law.' 55 However, the broad principles announced by Simmons do not provide guidance about the constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID law. 156
The Indiana Constitution explicitly authorizes the Indiana Legislature to enact a voter registration system, and Simmons confirms this
principle. 57 However, both the Indiana Constitution and Simmons
are silent as to whether requiring voters to show government-issued
ID is part of the registration process.158 Similarly, Simmons does es146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Simmons v. Byrd, 136 N.E. 14, 14-17 (Ind. 1922).
149. 136 N.E. 14.
150. Id. at 14.
151. Id. at 14-15.
152. Id. at 16-17.
153. Id. at 16. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Morris v. Powell, 25 N.E. 221, 222 (Ind.
1890)).
154. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 3-4
(quoting Simmons, 136 N.E.at 18).
155. See Simmons, 136 N.E. at 16-18.
156. See id.
157. See IND. CONST. art. II, § 14; See Simmons, 136 N.E. at 16-18.
158. See IND. CONST. art. II, § 14; See Simmons, 136 N.E. at 16-18.
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tablish that the Indiana Legislature has power to ensure elections are
free and clear, but Simmons does not define "free and clear. ' 159 Furthermore, even if a "free and clear" election is defined as a fraud-free
election, Simmons does not establish that requiring voters to present
government-issued ID is necessary to ensure that elections are free
and clear.16 ° Mirroring the shortcomings of the League's first argument, the State argued that Indiana's Voter ID law is within the power
61
of the legislature without defining the contours of that power.1
2. Procedural Regulations v. Substantive Qualifications. - Both
parties turned to the distinction between substance and procedure as a
way to define the contours of the Indiana Legislature's power to regulate elections.162 The League argued that Indiana's Voter ID law is
unconstitutional because it adds an additional "substantive qualification" outside the Indiana Constitution. 1 63 In response, the State argued that Indiana's Voter ID law is not a "substantive qualification"
but is instead a "procedural regulation.' 1 64 Accordingly, the State argued that the Indiana Legislature only has the authority to add procedural regulations, not substantive qualifications.1 65 According to the
State, the outer limits of the Indiana Legislature's power to regulate
elections lies at the line between procedural regulations and substanqualifications being beyond the
tive qualifications, with substantive
1 66
reach of the Indiana Legislature.
In Rosario v. Rockefeller,' 67 the United States Supreme Court explained the distinction. 68 The Court defined substantive voting qualifications as laws that "totally den[y] the electoral franchise to a
particular class of residents, and there is no way in which the members
of that class could [make] themselves eligible to vote.' 16 9 In contrast,
the Court defined procedural election regulations as laws that leave
some responsibility with the voter but "[do] not absolutely disen159. See Simmons, 136 N.E. at 16-18.
160. Id.
161. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 3-4.
162. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 16, League of
Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, No. 49D13-0806-PL-027627 (Ind. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 17,
2008), rev'd, 915 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss]; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 39, at 3.
163. See supra discussion Part II.B.
164. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 3.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
168. Id. at 757; See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note
39, at 4.
169. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 4 (quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 757 (1973)).
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franchise the class to which the petitioners belong."' 17 0 For example, a
sixteen-year-old Hoosier cannot vote for failure to meet the age requirement and realistically has no way of becoming eligible to vote.' 7 '
This example illustrates a substantive qualification. However, a Hoosier who does not have valid identification, although meeting the
other age, citizenship, residency, and registration requirements, is not
absolutely disenfranchised but is instead prevented from casting a ballot due to the voter's "own failure to take timely steps to effect [her]
enrollment. 1 72 This example illustrates a procedural regulation. Because the voter without ID is not absolutely disenfranchised from voting, unlike the sixteen-year-old Hoosier, Indiana's Voter
ID law is a
173
procedural regulation not a substantive qualification.
While the Indiana Supreme Court does not have to adopt Rosario's
bifurcated treatment of election rules, 74 textual analysis of the Indiana Constitution seems to validate this distinction between substantive qualifications and procedural regulations. 75 As Article II,
Section 2 provides, when a person meets the necessary qualifications
1 76
of age, citizenship, and residence, that person is entitled to vote.
Article II, Section 14 provides: "The General Assembly shall oversee
the registration of all those entitled to vote.' 7 7 This language reveals
that voter registration is distinct from being entitled to vote. To illustrate, if a person entitled to vote under Article II, Section 2 is properly
registered, the poll worker permits the voter to cast a ballot on election day.' 78 If a person entitled to vote under Article II, Section 2 is
unregistered,
the poll worker prohibits the voter from casting a ballot. 1 79 However, by stopping the unregistered voter from casting a
ballot, the poll worker cannot take away the person's Article II, Section 2 entitlement. By the language of the Indiana Constitution, voter
registration does not affect whether a person is entitled to vote. Arguably, this distinction between voter registration and entitlement
could be recast in the language of Rosario. An unregistered voter is
not stripped of his entitlement or "absolutely disenfranchised" from
170. Rosario, 410 U.S. at 757.
171. See Io. CONST. art. II, § 2.
172. Rosario, 410 U.S. at 758; See IND. CONST. art. II, § 14.
173. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 4.
174. See Holder v. State, 847 N.E. 2d 930, 935 (Ind. 2006).
175. To be clear, in League of Voters, neither party grounds the distinction between substantive qualifications and procedural regulations on the language of the Indiana Constitution; See
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 13, at 1-7; Memorandum in Support
of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 1-9.
176. IND. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
177. IND. CONsT. art. II, § 14.
178. IND. CODE § 3-7-48-1 (2009).
179. See id.
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voting; instead the person's "own failure" to register prevents the person from casting a ballot.1 8 °
In response, the League attempted to bypass this distinction drawn
by the State with an argument based on functionality, meaning that
regardless of the label you attach to Indiana's Voter ID law, functionally it can prevent a voter from casting a ballot just like an age, residency, citizenship, or registration requirement. 18 1 First, Indiana does
not allow persons to vote who fail to meet the age, residency, and
citizenship requirements. 182 Second, Indiana does not allow non-registered persons to vote. 83 Finally, Indiana does not allow persons
lacking valid identification to vote.'" In all three situations the outcome
is the same; the voter is not allowed to cast a meaningful ballot. 185 From a functional standpoint, application of all three laws
produces the same result, rendering the procedural-substantive distinction meaningless. 8 6
Nonetheless, the League's functionality argument cannot end the
analysis. Taking the League's functionality argument to its logical
conclusion would require the Indiana Supreme Court to strike down
as unconstitutional every election law that can potentially prevent a
voter from casting a ballot.'8 7 According to the League's theory,
every single election law with the potential to prevent a voter from
casting a ballot is unconstitutional unless the Indiana Constitution explicitly authorizes the Indiana Legislature to pass the law.' 88 As one
might surmise, the League's functionality theory is shortsighted, as
many Indiana election laws, although not explicitly addressed by the
Indiana Constitution, pass constitutional muster despite having potential to prevent a voter from casting a ballot. 89
Most importantly, before the Indiana Legislature passed Indiana's
Voter ID law, election officials verified the identify of Indiana voters
by signature matching, meaning if a voter's signature did not match
the signature that appeared in the poll book the poll worker would
challenge the voter, in the same way a poll worker today would chal180. IND. CONST. art. II, § 14; See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 758 (1973).
181. Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 162, at 20-22.
182. Id. at 21.
183. Id.
184. Id. (explaining that the voter can cast a provisional ballot, but without valid identification the vote will not influence the outcome of the election).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 5-6.
188. Id.
189. See id. The State provides two examples. First, Indiana law limits the amount of time a
voter may spend in the voting booth. IND. CODE §§ 3-11-11-10.5, -11-13-32.5, -11-14-26 to -28
(2009); Second, Indiana law prohibits a voter from divulging his or her ballot after marking it
but before casting it. IND. CODE §§ 3-11-11-16, -11-13-32.8, -11-14-29 (2009).
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lenge a voter with invalid identification. 190 Naturally, because both
laws are used to prove the identity of voters, the State analogized signature matching to presenting government-issued ID, arguing that because signature matching is constitutional Indiana's Voter ID law is
also constitutional. 9 ' Here, the State was correct that "no principled
constitutional distinction separates" signature matching from Indiana's Voter ID law, meaning the Indiana Constitution does not explicitly address either. 19 2 Nonetheless, one very important difference
remains - the Indiana Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality
of signature matching, while it has said nothing about the constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID law.1 93
Of course, the Indiana Supreme Court could buy the analogy between the two, but practically speaking signature matching and
presenting government-issued ID are very different.' 94 First, a voter
cannot forget her signature at home. Second, a voter's signature cannot expire. Third, a voter does not have to present a birth certificate
to obtain her signature from the state of Indiana or the federal government. Because the Indiana Constitution addresses neither signature matching nor requiring voters to present government-issued ID,
these practical distinctions are
all that remain to guide the analysis of
1 95
the Indiana Supreme Court.
3. Legal Standards.- Both parties address the legal standard that
96
should decide the constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID law.
While the League and the State argued that Simmons provides the
standard, the parties disagreed about which standard from Simmons
controls.197 The State posited that an election law is constitutional
unless it is "so grossly unreasonablethat compliance therewith is practically impossible."'9 8 The League argued that an election law is consti190. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 5.
191. Id. at 5-6.
192. Id. at 5.
193. Blue v. State, 188 N.E. 583, 591 (Ind. 1934), overruled by, 40 N.E.2d 115 (Ind. 1942),
explained by, 72 N.E.2d 225 (Ind. 1947).
194. Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 162, at 19 n.5 (noting that "requiring voters to ... identify themselves by name and signature [is not] remotely
equivalent to requiring a voter to produce a specific form of governmental-issued
identification").
195. See IND. CoNsT. art. II, § 2; IND. CoNsT. art. II, § 14 (discussing voting qualifications
and voter registration).
196. Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 162, at 39; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 7.
197. Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 162, at 39; Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 7.
198. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 7 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Simmons v. Byrd, 136 N.E. 14, 18 (Ind. 1922) (emphasis
added)).
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tutional if it is "reasonable, uniform, and impartial."'99 While
individually each standard presents problems, collectively, the result is
worse.
First, the two standards are very different. The standard proposed
by the State is much lower than the standard offered by the League.
If the court applies the language of the State's standard literally, the
Indiana Legislature would essentially have unchecked power to regulate elections. Under the standard proposed by the State, Indiana's
Voter ID law is constitutional unless it is "so grossly unreasonablethat
compliance therewith is practically impossible."2 ' "Practically impossible" seems to encompass very little. It is hard for anyone to argue
that Indiana's Voter ID law is "so grossly unreasonable that compliance therewith is practically impossible." Indiana provides IDs free of
charge.2" 1 If one has the required documents, a prospective voter only
needs a ride to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (herinafter "BMV") to
obtain the free ID. 02 It is hard to argue that obtaining a ride to the
BMV is "practically impossible." Even if one does not have a birth
certificate, it is hard to argue that it is "practically impossible" to obtain one.
Second, while both sides offer strong arguments to uphold or strike
down Indiana's Voter ID law, neither party provides any helpful guidance as to how each standard should be applied. 0 3 The standards are
radically different, and therefore the choice of which to apply may be
outcome-determinative. If the Indiana Supreme Court chooses to apply one of the two available standards from Simmons, the Court will
still not have an analytical framework with which to decide League of
Voters.
To illustrate, the League offered a series of arguments in support of
its conclusion that Indiana's Voter ID law is not "reasonable, uniform,
and impartial. ' 2 4 First, Indiana's Voter ID law discourages participation in the electoral process.20 5 Second, in 2008, the Voter ID law
disenfranchised twelve nuns in St. Joseph County.20 6 Third, in 2007,
the Voter ID law disenfranchised thirty-two voters in Marion
199. Simmons v. Byrd, 136 N.E. 14, 16-17 (Ind.1922). (emphasis added); See also Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 162, at 39; To be clear, the League
never articulates a precise standard that should govern League of Voters, however the League
does indirectly reference this standard from Simmons. Id.
200. Simmons, 136 N.E. at 18 (emphasis added).
201. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1614 n.4 (2008).
202. Id. at 1621.
203. See Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 162, at 1-24;
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 1-9.
204. Simmons, 136 N.E. at 16-17; See also Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 162, at 39.
205. Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 162, at 17.
206. Id. at 18.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol32/iss1/5

22

Neumann: Is Indiana's Voter ID Law a Bridge to Nowhere

90

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:68

County.2°7 Finally, the ancillary cost of obtaining a birth certificate
creates additional burdens on the right to vote.2 °8 All of these arguments are certainly relevant to whether the Voter ID law is "reasonable, uniform, and impartial." However, these arguments alone do not
establish when a law becomes "too unreasonable." These arguments
do not provide a definition for "uniform or impartial." Does "uniform" mean that the Voter ID law is constitutional if it is facially neutral? Does "impartial" mean the Voter ID law is unconstitutional if it
has a disparate impact on certain classes of voters?
Similarly, the State offered a series of arguments in support of its
conclusion that the Voter ID law is "not so grossly unreasonable that
compliance therewith is practically impossible. ' 20 9 First, almost everyone carries government-issued ID.2 1 Second, Indiana will issue the
voter an ID for free. 2 1 ' Third, if the voter does not have ID or forgets
ID, Indiana provides the voter ten days to validate her ballot.2 12 All
of these arguments certainly are factors in determining whether Indiana's Voter ID law is "so grossly unreasonable that compliance therewith is practically impossible." However, these arguments alone do
not establish when a law becomes "grossly unreasonable." These arguments alone do not establish the number of people for whom "compliance therewith [would be] practically impossible" before the law is
"grossly unreasonable." Is the Voter ID law unconstitutional if compliance is impossible for one person? Is the Voter ID law constitutional until compliance is impossible for everyone?
C.

Conclusion to the Case

Ultimately, the Indiana Supreme Court-assuming transfer is
granted-can resolve this case in a variety of ways. This case presents
multiple legal issues, and the legal landscape is convoluted. Any
broad pronouncement about Indiana's Voter ID law will stem from
Article II, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution. However, it is possible that the Indiana Supreme Court will reach an unsatisfactory result
if it confines its analysis to the language of the Indiana Constitution,
Indiana precedent, and general election policy.2 13 The parties' arguments place three provisions of the Indiana Constitution in equi207. Id.
208. Id. at 15.
209. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 1-9 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Simmons, 136 N.E. at 18).
210. Id. at 8.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See supra discussion Part II.A-C.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2009

23

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 [2009], Art. 5

INDIANA'S VOTER ID LAW

2009]

poise. 214 A handful of Indiana cases, all but one from before 1930, are
on point.2 15 However, like the Constitution, these dusty cases simultaneously provide ammunition for both the League and the State.2 16 In
hopes of avoiding an unsatisfactory result and with the aim of probing
the real-world impact of the law, the Indiana Supreme Court should
apply an alternative framework to decide the constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID law.
Il.

A

NORMATIVE APPROACH TO LEAGUE OF
WOMEN VOTERS, INC. V. ROKITA

In hopes of arriving at a satisfactory conclusion the Indiana Supreme Court should use an alternative framework to decide League of
Voters. This alternative approach should be simple and practical. The
goal of the Court should be to evaluate the real-world impact the law
has on individual voters and elections in general.21 7 The standard the
court should use is very simple: Does Indiana's Voter ID law do more
harm than good? 2 18 If Indiana's Voter ID law does more harm than
good, it is unconstitutional. Conversely, if Indiana's Voter ID law
does more good than harm, it is constitutional.
To answer this question, the Court should use a simple balancing
approach.219 This balancing approach should occur in three steps.
Step one requires the Court to articulate the benefits and burdens of
Indiana's Voter ID law.2 20 Step two requires the Court to individually
214. See supra discussion Part II.A.
215. See supra discussion Part II.A-B.
216. See supra discussion Part II.A-C.
217. Overton, supra note 21, at 653 ("Policy-makers need data on both fraud and access to
the polls to determine whether a photo-identification requirement would lead to fewer erroneous election outcomes .... ).
218. In one of the preeminent articles about voter identification, Professor Spencer Overton
inquires about "whether a photo-identification requirement would do more harm than good" while Professor Overton has not proposed this should be the legal standard governing voter
identification laws, he does imply that this is the most basic, foundational inquiry in deciding
whether voter identification laws should be struck down. Overton, supra note 21, at 635, 648,
651, 653. Another important article states that (1) the extent of vote fraud and (2) the extent of
vote denial are "the central empirical questions that should guide the decision over constitutionality of voter ID laws." Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 6, at 1740. See also Christopher S.
Elmendorf, Undue Burden on Voter Participation:New Pressures for a Structural Theory of the
Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 643, 654-59 (2008) (arguing that an "aggregate-consequences" model should be used to determine the constitutionality of voter participation claims).
219. A balancing approach is not a novel concept. See Crawford v. Marion County Election
Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616 (2008); See also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd.. 472 F.3d
949, 952-53 (7th Cir. 2007); See generally supra note 219 and accompanying text.
220. Balancing "benefits" and "burdens" of voter identification laws is not a novel concept.
See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616; Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952-953; See also Overton, supra note 21,
at 653; Pitts, supra note 2, at 500 (referring to "the debate over the benefits and burdens of
photo identification."); See generally supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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22 1
scrutinize each benefit and burden to determine its relative weight.
Stated otherwise, if the first step in the analysis asks what good does
this law accomplish, the second step in the analysis asks how much
good does this law accomplish. At step three in the analysis, the court
must weigh the good against the bad and make a decision. 2
The analytic guideposts throughout the Court's analysis should be
empiricism 2 23 and commonsense. 2 4 In a perfect world, empiricism
would be the only necessary guidepost and all the burdens and benefits created by Indiana's Voter ID would be quantified. 2 5 Once quantified, the burdens would be pitted against the benefits, and the
constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID law would be clear.
In reality, not every effect of Indiana's Voter ID law can be quantified, because unfortunately, the debate surrounding voter identification "presents a series of largely unanswered, and in some respects,
unanswerable empirical questions. '2 6 Ultimately, empiricism is not
enough. 2 7 Therefore, where empiricism is not available to guide the
analysis, commonsense is the only alternative. Opponents often criticize voter identification laws as inadequately justified by "common
sense popular notions '228 and warn that "wrapping an argument 229
'in
the mantle of common sense [is] certainly cause for suspicion.'
Taking a realist approach to the shortcomings of empiricism, the Indiana Supreme Court should acknowledge that commonsense is all that
remains to guide the analysis in some circumstances. Applying this
alternative framework, an empirical-realist model, the Indiana Su221. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
This step is akin to considering the "'the character and magnitude of the asserted injury."' Id.
222. Id. at 1616. This step is akin to making the "'hard judgment' our adversary system
demands." Id.
223. Using empiricism as an analytical guidepost is not a novel concept. Myriad commentators have called for and taken up efforts to increase the availability of empirical data about voter
identification laws. See Pitts, supra note 2, at 500 (conducting a comprehensive phone survey
and provisional ballot collection to determine the impact of Indiana's Voter ID law on
Hoosiers); Overton, supra note 21, at 631 (calling for better empirical data to understand the
extent of voter fraud and the exclusion of legitimate voters caused by voter identification laws);
Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 6, at 1738 (conducting a national survey "to assess how
widespread fear of ... election fraud is").
224. Commentators often criticize the use of commonsense. See Overton, supra note 21, at
652 ("[P]olicy-makers should resist the temptation to rush to adopt [voter identification laws]
based solely on anecdotes, analogy, and 'common sense' popular assumptions ....
).
225. See id. at 663 ("Empirical data is not perfect ... it allows for a better understanding of
the true costs and benefits of a photo-identification requirement and permits a more honest
debate about the democratic values at issue.").
226. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 6, at 1738.
227. See Overton, supra note 21, at 669 (noting that "empirical data does not answer all
questions").
228. Id. at 652 (internal quotations omitted).
229. Id. at 652 (quoting Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD.
L. Rav. 1093, 1094-95 (1996)).
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preme Court should aim to evaluate the real-world impacts of Indiana's Voter ID law.
In truth, this empirical-realist framework does not differ drastically
from the "undue burden" standard used by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford.23 ° In Crawford, the undue burden standard
was stated as follows: "[A] court evaluating a constitutional challenge
to an election regulation [should] weigh the asserted injury to the right
to vote against the 'precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.' 2'' 13 In truth, inquiring
whether Indiana's Voter ID law does more harm than good is not a
radical departure from weighing the "asserted injury" against the
"precise interests" of the State. Nonetheless, the two standards are
not identical. To be exact, the empirical-realist framework is in some
ways similar to and other ways different from the undue burden standard. Both the similarities and the differences are important. In fact,
the normative design of this empirical-realist framework intends four
important consequences.
First, the empirical-realist framework mitigates the indeterminacy
of the undue burden standard, meaning it attempts to make the undue
burden standard less nebulous and easier to apply in a consistent manner.2 32 Despite their similarities, the empirical-realist framework is
conceptually much simpler than the undue burden standard. Commentators often criticize the undue burden standard as "an indeterminate framework [which allows courts to] reach seemingly partisan
decisions. "233 Providing conceptual simplicity to the undue burden
standard is an attempt to answer this criticism. This conceptual simplicity is possible because in the context of voter identification laws,
the analysis can be distilled to a very simple inquiry: Does the voter
identification law do more harm than good? By balancing the extent
of voter fraud against the extent of vote denial, the Indiana Supreme
Court can distill the inquiry to the two "central empirical questions"
relevant to the constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID law.23 4
230. The United States Supreme Court has used the undue burden standard to decide election law issues since the 1970s. Overton, supra note 21, at 654-59 (providing a comprehensive
history of the development of the undue burden standard). See generally Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Crawford v.
Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
231. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at
434).
232. Elmendorf, supra note 218, at 651.
233. Id. (noting that the partisan divide in voter identification litigation calls into question
the ability of American courts to set aside partisan prejudice when faced with political-process
questions which causes judges to appear as "de facto agents for their political party of choice").
234. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 6, at 1740.
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Second, the normative design of this empirical-realist framework
forces the Indiana Supreme Court to take a one-tiered approach. 35
Courts have applied the undue burden standard in two very different
ways-a two-tiered approach and a one-tiered approach.236 Courts
taking the two-tiered approach apply "strict scrutiny for severe burdens and something else for lesser ones," while courts taking the
open-ended, one-tiered approach consider all laws under the same
level of scrutiny.237 Because the undue burden standard fails to guide
courts toward the appropriate choice, this empirical-realist framework
further mitigates the indeterminacy of the undue burden by rescinding
the Indiana Supreme Court's choice between the one and two-tiered
approach. 238 This rescission forces the Court to apply an "open-ended
balancing [test]" using one level of scrutiny, which provides additional
simplicity. 239 However, to understand why the one-tiered approach is
preferred to the two-tiered approach, one must consider competing
theories of the right to vote.24°
The normative design of this alternative framework intends an important third consequence, funneling the Indiana Supreme Court toward a structural approach to the right to vote.24 1 Two competing
theories are often used to explain the right to vote. One theory considers the right to vote as an individual right, i.e., a right possessed by
an individual, while another theory considers the right to vote as a
structural-collective right, i.e. the right of "the people" to elect a representative government.242 Giving a court unchecked freedom to oscillate between one and two-tiered scrutiny and both theories of the
right to vote can encourage hyper-partisan decisions, meaning courts
have wiggle room to decide cases exactly as they please, often in step
with partisan loyalty.2 43 By constraining the Indiana Supreme Court
to one-tiered scrutiny and funneling the Court towards a structural
theory of the right to vote, this empirical-realist framework is an attempt to remove from the table any partisan temptations. 2 " The empirical-realist framework imports a structural theory of the right to
vote and forces the Indiana Supreme Court to consider the macro235. Elmendorf, supra note 218, at 656.
236. Id. (articulating two different approaches courts have used in applying the undue burden standard).
237. Id. (noting Judge Richard Posner uses the one-tiered and the United States Supreme
Court uses the two-tiered approach).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 643-46.
241. Id. at 644-45.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 656-57.
244. Id. at 656.
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level effects of Indiana's Voter ID law. 24 5 Afterwards, however, the
simple balancing test of this alternative framework forces the Court to
focus on the micro-level impact of the law. 246 By providing the Indiana Supreme Court with a means of panning between a micro and
macro-level perspective, the design of this empirical-realist framework
aims to avoid seemingly partisan decisions.2 47
Finally, the normative design of this empirical-realist framework
charts a centrist course, meaning Crawford2 4 8 is neither fully rejected
nor fully embraced. Designing the empirical-realist framework similar
to the undue burden standard acknowledges that the analytical approach of Crawford was correct; a balancing approach is the appropriate framework to analyze Indiana's Voter ID law, albeit in the simpler
manner proposed by this Note. 249 Furthermore, application of this
empirical-realist framework reveals the outcome of Crawford was correct: Indiana's Voter ID law should have survived challenge under the
federal constitution. However, the reasoning on which Crawford rests
its conclusion was incorrect. Undoubtedly, Indiana's Voter ID law is
valid under the United States Constitution-Crawford was right about
this much. What Crawford failed to acknowledge was the thin ground
on which the Indiana Legislature stood when it passed Indiana's Voter
ID law.2 10 Accordingly, gratuitous agreement with Crawford about
the validity of Indiana's Voter ID law under the United States Constitution is replaced by the sobering realization that the law occupies a
legislative dead zone where it manages to accomplish little good but
survives nonetheless by causing little harm. Crawford was not wrong,
but Crawford was not completely right either. Discovering the surprising firmness of this middle ground is important to recognize as the
debate surrounding Indiana's Voter ID law lurches forward.

IV.

APPLYING THE ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK TO LEAGUE
OF WOMEN VOTERS, INC. V. ROKITA

Application of the empirical-realist framework helps demonstrate
the firmness of this middle ground by revealing Indiana's Voter ID
law as constitutionally valid but legislatively dubious. Acclimation to
this centrist position inevitably brings to light the larger implications
that attach to recognizing both the futility and the constitutionality of
Indiana's Voter ID law.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 702-03.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 656-57.
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616-24 (2008).
See supra text accompanying note 216-224.
See infra discussion Part IV.
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A. Articulating the Benefits and Burdens of Indiana's Voter ID
Law
Deciding whether Indiana's Voter ID law does more harm than
good requires the Indiana Supreme Court to articulate the potential
benefits and burdens of the law. 251 Regarding the good it creates, the
following benefits potentially justify upholding Indiana's Voter ID
law. First, Indiana's Voter ID law potentially prevents voters from
casting fraudulent votes. 25 2 Second, Indiana's Voter ID law potentially increases public confidence in the electoral process.2 53 Regarding the harm it causes, Indiana's Voter ID law potentially prevents
legitimate voters from casting ballots.2 5 4
B.

Scrutinizing the Benefits and Burdens of Indiana's Voter ID
Law

The second step in this alternative framework requires the Court to
individually scrutinize each benefit and burden enumerated in step
one to determine its relative weight.2 5 5 At step two in the analysis, the
Indiana Supreme Court should be particularly mindful of the two analytical guideposts
central to this framework-empiricism and
25 6
commonsense.
1. How much fraud does Indiana's Voter ID law prevent? - The
analysis begins with empiricism. Authorities have not discovered any
cases of in-person voter fraud in Indiana. 7 However, this empirical
insight overlooks two problems. First, "successful fraud goes undetected," meaning that if a voter successfully casts a fraudulent vote,
authorities will struggle to detect it short of a confession from the
voter. 258 Second, many cases of in-person voter fraud prevented or
deterred by Indiana's Voter ID law may also go undetected, meaning
that when a poll worker asks a would-be fraudulent voter to present
identification, that would-be fraudulent voter is likely to leave the polling place immediately, claiming to have forgotten her ID, rather than
stay and risk prosecution.2 59 In both situations, successful and pre251. See supra discussion Part III.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
255. See supra discussion Part III.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 222-223.
257. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1618-1619 (2008) (noting that
the "record contains no evidence of [in person voter fraud] actually occurring in Indiana at any
time in its history.").
258. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 6, at 1738.
259. Timothy J. Ryan, Voter ID Laws Need Measured Implementation, AEI-BROOKINO
ELECTION REFORM PROJECT NEWSLETTER, (AEI-Brooking Election Reform Project, Washing-
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vented voter fraud, the fraud goes undetected and causes authorities
to underreport the prevalence of in-person voter fraud in Indiana and
elsewhere. Ultimately, given these empirical roadblocks, the preva-

lence of in-person voter fraud may be an "unanswerable question"

presented by Indiana's Voter ID law. 26' Nonetheless, one final commonsense observation is important: in-person voter fraud is an "inef-

ficient method of influencing the outcome of an election." '6 1

Ultimately, the prevalence of in-person voter fraud is probably not
widespread because it is easier to influence the outcome of an election
by running an absentee ballot scheme or by rigging a voting machine.26 2 Stated otherwise, if an in-person voter fraud scheme is to

have any chance of influencing the outcome of an election, an entire
army of fraudulent voters would need to be turned loose on election
day.
2. How much does Indiana's Voter ID law increase public confidence in elections? - Proponents justify Indiana's Voter ID law because it arguably increases public confidence in the electoral
process.2 63 Stated otherwise, regardless of whether it actually prevents voter fraud, Indiana's Voter ID law may still prevent the "appearance" of voter fraud. 264 This potential to increase public
confidence in electoral integrity "presents a testable empirical proposition. '' 265 Commentators have tested this empirical proposition
and concluded "voter identification requirements will [not] raise
levels of trust in the electoral process. "266 Nonetheless, a related
study indicates that three in every four voters support voter identification requirements. 267 Seemingly these surveys reach contradictory reton, D.C.), April 17, 2007, http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1555 (last visited Feb. 27,
2009) (stating that authorities "only know about fraud when it is caught; who knows how much
fraud escapes our attention").
260. See supra text accompanying note 227.
261. Schultz, supra note 39, at 498.
262. Id. Professor David Schultz, relying on an Election Assistance Commission report, observes that "impersonation of voters is probably the least frequent type of fraud because it is the
most likely type of fraud to be discovered, there are stiff penalties associated with this type of
fraud, and it is an inefficient method of influencing an election." Id.
263. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 39, at 2-3.
264. DeLaney, supra note 47, at 847-49.
265. Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 6, at 1739 (conducting a national survey to determine the relationship between forcing a voter to identify themselves and the likelihood that the
voter perceives fraud in the electoral process).
266. Id. at 1759. This comprehensive study examined "survey data from 2006, 2007, and 2008
to calculate how pervasive Americans believe vote fraud to be .. " Id. at 1742.
267. Ansolabehere, supra note 77, at 618-20 (reporting that over 75% of survey respondents
support voter identification laws). This study examined survey data collected in 2006 that "asked
whether respondents approved of laws requiring voter identification." Id. at 616.
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suits. 2 6 8

At best, the only firm conclusion the Indiana Supreme Court
can reach is that despite failing to increase public confidence in the
electoral process, well over half of all Hoosiers approve of Indiana's
Voter ID law.
3. How many legitimate voters does Indiana's Voter ID law prevent
from casting a ballot? - Importantly, comprehensive data about the
impact of Indiana's Voter ID law on Hoosier voters is available.26 9 In

fact, this data is the first attempt to conclusively determine the number of Indiana voters that show up at the polls without valid identification.2 7 ° Although the data is not perfect,2 7 ' it nonetheless provides

empirical insight into the impact of Indiana's Voter ID law.2 72
In Indiana's 2008 primary election, Indiana voters cast 1,727,023 total ballots, and Indiana's Voter ID law prevented 321 voters from casting ballots that influenced the outcome of the election.

73

In Indiana's

2008 general election, Indiana voters cast 2,805,902 total ballots, and
Indiana's Voter ID law prevented 902 voters from casting a ballot that
influenced the election.2 7 ' Therefore, in Indiana's 2008 primary election, Indiana's Voter ID law prevented .019% of Indiana voters from
casting a meaningful ballot. 5 In Indiana's 2008 general election, Indiana's Voter ID law prevented .032% of Indiana voters from casting

a meaningful ballot.2 76 Collectively, in Indiana during the 2008 pri-

mary and 2008 general elections, Indiana's Voter ID law prevented
.027% of Indiana voters from casting a meaningful ballot.2 77
C. Making a Decision
After scrutinizing the benefits and burdens of Indiana's Voter ID
law, the third and final step in the analysis requires the court to weigh
268. Id. at 626 ("These findings undercut much of the heated rhetoric that has inflated the
debate over voter ID requirements .... ").
269. See Pitts, supra note 2, at 478-80.
270. See id. at 478-80; In truth, this is the only such data for any state with a photo identification requirement. Id.
271. Id. at 480 (admitting that the survey "may not provide a perfect data set.
.
272. Id. at 504.
273. Id. at 499-500 n. 89 (reporting that 321 Indiana voters cast a provisional ballot because
they lacked identification and ultimately failed to return to the county election board to validate
their provisional ballot).
274. Michael J. Pitts & Matthew D. Neumann, Documenting Disfranchisement. Voter Identification at Indiana's2008 General Election (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 9 n.42) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1465529 (reporting that 902 Indiana voters
cast a provisional ballot because they lacked identification and ultimately failed to return to the
county election board to validate their provisional ballot).
275. See Pitts, supra note 2, at 480.
276. See Pitts & Neumann, supra note 274 (manuscript at 22).
277. See Pitts, supra note 2, at 499-500 n. 89.
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the evidence and make a decision.2 7 8 After step two, the Indiana Supreme Court is left with three relatively firm conclusions. First, the
prevalence of in-person voter fraud in Indiana is probably minimal.27 9
Second, although studies indicate that Indiana's Voter ID law does
not increase public confidence in the electoral process, a large majority of Hoosiers probably approve of Indiana's Voter ID law. 280 Third,
in 2008 during Indiana's primary and general elections, Indiana's
Voter ID law prevented approximately .027% of Hoosier voters from
casting a meaningful ballot.2 81
Ultimately, the Indiana Supreme Court should uphold Indiana's
Voter ID law as valid under the Indiana Constitution. First, Indiana's
Voter ID law is constitutional because it affects a very small number
of voters.2 8 2 In 2008, over 99.9% of Indiana voters that arrived at the
polls had their government-issued identification. 28 3 Even if this empirical study underestimated by ten fold the number of disenfranchised voters (an error rate of 1000%), still over 99.7% of Indiana
voters showed up to the polls with identification.2 8 4 Accordingly, the
fundamental reason that the Indiana Supreme Court should uphold
Indiana's Voter ID law is because its bottom-line impact is minimal.
To return to the standard, Indiana's Voter ID law causes very little
harm.
Second, Indiana's Voter ID law should be upheld because Indiana
provides free IDs. Simply put, the available data reveals that most
Hoosiers have government-issued identification cards.2 8 5 For the
small number of prospective voters without an ID, Indiana waives the
fee. 86 The only legitimate attack remaining in the arsenal of opponents is that birth certificates are required to obtain the free ID, and
birth certificates still cost between $3 and $12.287 In the context of a
facial attack on Indiana's Voter ID law, ancillary costs to obtaining
identification is a potentially "fixable" problem. If the Indiana Supreme Court found the ancillary costs constitutionally problematic,
the Indiana Legislature could correct the problem by statutorily waiv278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
whether
affected
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See supra discussion Part I1.
See supra discussion Part IV.B.1.
See supra discussion Part IV.B.2.
See supra discussion Part IV.B.3.
See Pitts, supra note 2, at 480 (anticipating that proponents of Indiana's Voter ID law,
right or wrong, will use the data to argue a very small percentage of the electorate is
by Indiana's Voter ID law).
See supra discussion Part IV.B.3.
See supra discussion Part IV.B.3.
See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
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ing the fee for Indiana issued birth certificates for those that cannot
afford to pay.
Third, Indiana's Voter ID law is constitutional because the reason

1,218 Hoosiers showed up at the polls without identification is unknown. 288 On one hand, it is certainly plausible that some, perhaps
289
most, of the 1,218 voters were disenfranchised because of indigence.

However, it is equally plausible that some, potentially many, of the
1,218 voters were disenfranchised because of laziness, forgetfulness,
and apathy. 290 The former group is appropriately labeled disen-

franchised, but the latter group is certainly not. Without inquiring
into the reason the voter failed to present valid ' 29identification, it is
short-sided to label them all as "disenfranchised. '
Upholding Indiana's Voter ID law under the Indiana Constitution

will undoubtedly leave a sour taste in the mouths of many. This sour
taste is not without meaning; in fact it demonstrates why voter identification laws present such a thorny issue. Indiana's Voter ID law
places access and integrity, the competing cornerstones of election law

jurisprudence, on a collision course.292 However, research continues

to reveal that Indiana's Voter ID law has a minimal impact on both
access and integrity. 2 93 One might wonder why the debate continues
if Indiana's Voter ID law neither increases electoral integrity nor bur-

dens voter access.2 94 Seemingly this minimal impact on access and integrity should lower the stakes of the debate-while in reality it often
appears the inverse is true.2 95 Importantly, reading between the lines
reveals the subtext of this fevered debate; voter identification is a
symptom of the battle for the control of electoral mechanics.29 6
In the end, despite concluding that Indiana's Voter ID law is des-

tined to survive challenge under the Indiana Constitution, continued
288. See Pitts, supra note 2, at 480 (noting that the "data does not tell us why prospective
voters who appeared at the polls lacked photo identification").
289. See id. at 503 (noting that "It's not known if (or how many) persons were indigent").
290. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
291. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1620 (2008) (noting that
"life's vagaries," such as a lost identification or a stolen wallet, do not implicate the constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID law). See also Pitts, supra note 2, at 503.
292. See Ansolabehere, supra note 77, at 628 ("It is commonplace to debate election regulations as a tradeoff between access and integrity."); See Muhammad At-Tauhidi, Note, Access v.
Integrity: Determiningthe Constitutionalityof Voter ID Laws under Anderson v. Celebrezze, 17
Temp. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 215, 216 (2007) (referring to "the fundamental tension between
access and integrity underlying the voter ID debate").
293. See Ansolabehere, supra note 77, at 629 (concluding "the values of access and integrity
simply do not seem to have much play in the actual use of ID requirements").
294. See supra text accompanying notes II.B.3.
295. See supra text accompanying note 16.
296. See At-Tauhidi, supra note 292, at 220 (characterizing voter identification laws as "designed to maximize partisan advantage"). See also Elmendorf, supra note 218, at 646-47.
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research is the only remedy that will settle this debate.2 97 Most importantly, research must uncover the reason why voters are arriving at the
polls without their IDs. If laziness or forgetfulness, rather than indigence, is the barrier, as this author suspects, Indiana's Voter ID law
may be here to stay. If indigence is the primary force at work, the
constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID law will need to be
reevaluated.
CONCLUSION

Inevitably, the Indiana Supreme Court will have the final word on
Indiana's Voter ID law. Unfortunately, Indiana constitutional election jurisprudence provides a somewhat unsatisfactory framework.
Accordingly, the Indiana Supreme Court should use an empirical-realist framework to decide League of Women Voter of Indiana, Inc. v.
Rokita. By forcing the Indiana Supreme Court to pragmatically consider the real-world impact of the law, application of this empiricalrealist framework will reveal that Indiana's Voter ID law passes muster under the Indiana Constitution. Undoubtedly critics and litigants
will disagree with this decision. These critics and litigants should not
be deterred from their efforts to invalidate the law because close examination reveals that the efficacy of Indiana's Voter ID rests on fragile ground. In truth, the Indiana Legislature probably did not have
cause to pass Indiana's Voter ID law at the time it was enacted. On
the other hand the law hardly seems to cause enough problems to
justify striking it down. Stuck in a proverbial no man's land where it
causes little harm but accomplishes little good, Indiana's Voter ID law
may ultimately be a bridge to nowhere.

297. See Pitts, supra note 2, at 505 (stating that "it is only with additional research that we
can begin to come to more definitive conclusions as to the costs and benefits of photo
identification").
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